- Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy Conference on Corporate Law
- Representation Without Accountability?
- Business Law Practitioners Series – Fall 2011
- The Philosophy and Practice of Disclosure
- BLPS – Rory Cutaia ’85
- The Looming Problems of The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
- Financial Reform Legislation: There Ought To Be A Law, But Is This It?
News & Events
- New: How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash July 24, 2015This post appeared first on Fordham Corporate Law BlogThis Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation — the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several […]Sean J. Griffith
- REVISION: The Artificial Collective-Action Problem in Lawsuits Against Insured Defendants July 7, 2015This post appeared first on Fordham Corporate Law BlogIn lawsuits against defendants covered by liability insurance, the parties negotiate toward a single settlement amount that collectively binds the plaintiff and all defense-side parties (the defendant and its liability insurer). This settlement method produces a collective-action problem whenever the trial outcome is uncertain and the potential […]Richard C. Squire
- Corporate Compliance Institute (7/6/2015 – 7/10/2015) July 6, 2015This post appeared first on Fordham Corporate Law BlogStart Date: 7/6/2015 Start Time: 1:00 PMEnd Date: 7/10/2015 End Time: 1:00 PMLincoln Center Campus - Fordham University School of LawLincoln Center Campus - Fordham University School of LawRoom: 4-07Summer Compliance Train...This post appeared first on Fordham Corporate Law BlogFORDHAM SCHOOL OF LAW - Corporate Law Center Events Calendar for Fordham University
Highlights From Previous Books
THE BEHAVIORAL PARADOX: WHY INVESTOR IRRATIONALITY CALLS FOR LIGHTER AND SIMPLER FINANCIAL REGULATION
It is widely believed that behavioral economics justifies more intrusive regulation of financial markets, because people are not fully rational and need to be protected from their quirks. This Article challenges that belief. Firstly, insofar as people can be helped to make better choices, that goal can usually be achieved through light-touch regulations. Secondly, faulty […]